Islamism beyond the bogeymen

For decades, scores of Western pundits have described Islamist movements as irrational bogeymen, inherently violent, bent on mayhem and destruction. They have been said to glorify values that sharply contradict the assumed norms of Western Enlightenment, such as tolerance, equality, pluralism and democracy. The rise of al Qaeda and images of its vicious deeds strengthened this narrative and, indeed, seemed to verify the perception of Islamists as one-dimensional diehard fanatics.

But those images could also be understood as profoundly stereotypical; misleading, simplistic and banal. The reality is that Islamists movements appear in many different formats, some of which are inclusive and peaceful, embracing pluralism and questioning the rigid dogma, totalitarianism and xenophobia of other Islamist groupings.

Islamists movements are often defined as promoting the establishment of an Islamic state, based upon Islamic law, the sharia. While most Islamists would not deny this quest for an Islamic penetration of the public and private sphere of life, they have various perceptions of how this is to be done — and what battles are to be picked. Whereas some Islamists, like Hezbollah and Hamas, primarily perceive the struggle as taking place on the national level, others, like al Qaeda, want to transfer the struggle to a trans-national level, stretching across borders and territories.

What in many cases make Islamists popular is their socio-economic pathos, often manifested by widespread and well organised social-welfare work, and their criticism of the malfeasance, corruption and despotism perpetrated by inept and repressive authorities. Hence, in addition to the quest for an Islamic order, the Islamist agenda could be considered as a critical narrative weighing in on the existing state of affairs in many Arab and Muslim countries. In this sense, Islamists are voicing concerns that previously were raised by political and ideological activists of a secular character — leftists and nationalists, for example.  This also accounts for how Islamists time and again rage against the subordination, real or perceived, of Arab and Muslim regimes vis-a-vis the various Western interests in the region. But in contrast to their secular predecessors, Islamists ground their criticism and ideology in the mores and assumptions of Islam.

This religious profundity is directly connected to a particular understanding of the nature of man. That is, whereas Islamists have many different objectives and preferences when it comes to ‘the ideal’ political system, they share in a common criticism, although not necessarily an outright rejection, of the secular order. To Islamists, the nature of mankind is too emotional, overly inclined towards corruption and destructive desires, and thus it is in need of religious guidance. This is why Islamist thinkers believe that the Western Enlightenment’s hailing of the human spirit and reason as the force capable of establishing a just order is erroneous, if not dangerous.

According to the Islamist perspective, this absence of divine direction is manifest in the many injustices of the world, of which Western intrusion and domination of weaker nations and regions is perhaps the most prominent. Indeed, to Islamists, the absence of God’s guidance also explains the weakness and powerlessness of Muslims today. To Islamists, seeking divine guidance is thus a way to boost the self-esteem needed to resist and restructure an oppressive and humiliating order. Resistance is thus a key word for Islamists because to them the struggle is primarily defensive. It is intended to ward off external intrusion. Depending on social, political and other contexts, some groups see this struggle taking place on the national arena, others believe it to be a trans-national struggle.

A discourse of resistance notwithstanding, al Qaeda’s glorification of violence and mayhem seems to have had little resonance among the revolts of the ‘Arab spring’ in which slogans have mostly concerned social-economic betterment, political rights and elite accountability. This does not mean that Islamism, in many of its varieties, is no longer a political factor to be reckoned with. Islamist parties of a more national and inclusive character are gaining considerable ground and wield influence in countries such as Tunisia and Egypt, and their counterparts have already made headway into the political systems of a range of Arab and Muslim countries.

Islamist movements vary in their tactics, strategies and objectives because they each stem from the unique environments in which they operate. Hezbollah’s praise for an armed resistance was born in a ferocious battle against the Israeli occupation of south Lebanon, but the movement is getting more and more politically embedded in Lebanese society and politics. Al Qaeda’s trans-national — and equally violent — ambition for a global Caliphate stemmed in part from the assumption that the region’s repressive regimes were unlikely to be changed from within. Perhaps the Arab spring has proven that assumption erroneous and displayed a new, non-violent and more inclusive path.

Anders Strindberg teaches at the Naval Postgraduate School, Center for Homeland Defense and Security, in Monterey, California.  Mats Wärn is Research Associate in the Politics of Development Group at Stockholm University (PODSU).