General Winner

The War in Helmand is now part of everyday consciousness. The death of another British soldier features weekly as a major item in the news. Yet, despite this heightened awareness of the numerous casualties inflicted on our troops in a very small area not only of Afghanistan but Helmand itself — British troops now operate principally around Lashkar Gar and the Upper Sangin Valley — the British public seems to be mystified by the campaign as a whole. They have little understanding of why our troops are fighting in Helmand and are increasingly restless about the expenditure of so many lives in pursuit of an apparently incomprehensible objective.

It is perhaps precisely because the British public, informed by highly partial media coverage, are focused exclusively on Helmand that the deaths there seem so pointless. Yet, there is a rationale to the current Afghan campaign, even if it has not been articulated clearly. Perhaps that strategic rationale might become clearer if the public were aware of another British contribution to Afghanistan independent of the fighting in Helmand, of which they have up to now been totally ignorant.

In October 2009, Headquarters 6th (UK) Division deployed to Kandahar Airfield to provide the commander and core staff for Combined Joint Task Force 6 which presently leads Regional Command South.  Headquarters 6 Division, commanded by Major General Nick Carter, a highly respected infantry officer, and initially consisting of around 55 staff, is not a standing formation but was created exclusively in order to execute this mission.  As it stands today, it will be disbanded on returning to Britain. By then it will be Britain’s longest serving command in Afghanistan. 6 Division’s command will last for a full year, until November 2010, when it hands over to its US replacement 10th Mountain Division.

The formation, therefore, represents a major, though unacknowledged, British commitment to Afghanistan in the decisive Southern theatre at a critical time in the campaign as ISAF implements its population centric counter-insurgency strategy and prepares to exploit the surge.  The UK command represents the continuing respect with which the British military is held by the US.

6 Division was formally inaugurated on 7 April 2008 in preparation for the tour of Afghanistan which started in October 2009.  Crucially, this new formation in the British Army’s structure was founded by staff with recent operational experience from Southern Afghanistan, thereby institutionalizing a deep understanding of the campaign from the start.  Furthermore, from its base in North Yorkshire, it continued to develop its operational edge by ensuring an intimate connection to live planning and operational events in Afghanistan, as well as taking the lead for bringing UK Task Forces, destined for the challenges of Southern Afghanistan, to a high level of preparedness ahead of their deployments.

By July 2009, HQ 6 Division with its core of UK staff had commenced a rapid expansion to form Combined Joint Task Force 6, eventually comprising some 670 multinational staff — with the UK as the majority stakeholder.  Now established as CJTF 6, the headquarters began to develop a revised operational design for the South that was needed to account for ISAF’s new population-centric strategy and the considerable increase in forces being made available as part of the surge.  

NATO had taken command of the South in 2006. The British, Dutch and Canadians had produced national task forces for Helmand, Uruzgan, Zabul and Kandahar and were under Regional Command South which was commanded on a rotational basis by the three nations.  However, while the regional headquarters nominally controlled the entire region, in reality, the four main provincially-based task forces operated all but independently.  Crucially, available resources made it difficult to execute the regional level approach needed to deliver progress across the South.  

Therefore, for CJTF 6, the initial priority was to create and execute a coherent operational plan which unified the efforts of the task forces and supported their operations on the basis of rational campaign priorities. In July 2009, in the first of a series of command meetings in preparation for the tour, Major General Carter began to sketch out his operational design on a white board in West Down Camp on Salisbury Plain; this concept has remained intact to this day. This early work recognized, in line with US thinking, that NATO could not hope to secure the whole country.

Military, governance and development efforts had to be concentrated on the decisive areas in the South. It was not difficult for Nick Carter to identify the key areas within his future command. For him, central Helmand and, above all, Kandahar City and its environs were critical. These areas represented the main population centres in the south and acted as the hubs of political and economic power, trade and transport. In the case of Kandahar City, the city was also the capital of Pashtun culture and religion. Carter was himself under no doubt that Kandahar City was primary to success in the South.

Accordingly, the plan was sketched out in a simple pregnant schematic which depicted the effects which needed to be achieved to secure progress in the South. Around central Helmand, Carter drew a ring which was to be protected from the insurgency by the Combined Team of Afghan National Security and ISAF forces.  The outskirts of Kandahar City were not only to be protected by the Combined Team but, decisively, the centre of the city was also to be secured for the population.  The scheme envisaged an intensification of security, governance and development efforts in the central urban area to demonstrate the growing legitimacy and efficacy of the government.  

In order to link Kandahar City with the wider region, freedom of movement had to be delivered along the main highways in the South and some greater level of control had to be exercised over border crossings with Pakistan at Spin Boldak and Baram Char. This plan, which is being driven into action now, could be summarized into its fundamental actions: protect central Helmand, secure Kandahar city, establish freedom of movement on the highways and control the border crossings into Pakistan.  Indeed, Major General Carter’s plan remains as valid today as it did when the final version was written in Kandahar in December 2009 (see left).

The campaign schematic, originally sketched back in July 2009, has remained intact after eight months in theatre. In February 2010, the operation to protect central Helmand, Operation Moshtarak, was initiated by Major General Carter following an intense process of political engagement. The operation was especially difficult for the US Marines in Marjeh but the situation around Lashkar Gar is almost unrecognizable from even January 2010 when insurgents moved at will.  

Governor Mangal now exerts authority over the central area, directing economic development and enjoying a freedom of movement inconceivable in the past, when it was difficult for him or any other national to leave their compounds at night. Insurgents still threaten central Helmand, as recent British deaths show, but one of the main effects identified by Carter back on Salisbury Plain has been achieved.

Major General Carter is under no illusion, however, that the early elements of Operation Moshtarak were secondary and preparatory stages in his operational design — demanded as much by domestic political realities in the West as by realities in Afghanistan. Since the beginning of CJTF 6’s tour and especially since March, the central focus has been on Kandahar and specifically improving security in and around the city. On the basis of the original schematic, the Regional Command South planning team (with a core of the original 6 Division staff) produced an outline plan for the Kandahar operation in November 2009.

This plan involved the deployment of ISAF and Afghan security forces in concentric rings around the city. In the outer ring, General Carter and his partner, General Zazai from 205th Corps Afghan National Army, positioned Combined Team troops.  Specifically for ISAF, a Brigade Combat Team from the 101st Airborne was assigned to the area following Obama’s decision to surge; they deployed into theatre in May and June and are currently seeking to disrupt and deny insurgent ingress into the city. Afghan National Army troops from the 205th Corps will be deployed into an inner circle on the city’s edges.

The training and command infrastructure is currently being prepared for this insertion, and with transition to the Afghans firmly in mind. Finally, Afghan National Civil Order Police, eventually to be replaced by Afghan National Police, will take control of the central area of the city, securing the population from insurgent influence through a series of integrated check points and controls. A central condition of the success of the operation is that it is led and delivered by Afghans and, above all, by the government of Afghanistan. To this end, Nick Carter has repeatedly emphasized to his staff the need for ‘aggression transition’ to Afghan ownership.

Initially, CJTF 6 believed they would be able to complete the operation and secure Kandahar City in the course of their deployment. However, on arrival in theatre, the complexity of the situation which confronted them became clear and the risks of turning Kandahar into a Grozny dissuaded them from pre-emptive action. Over the last eight months, they have sensibly focused on shaping operations instead.

Critically, they have sought to create the political conditions for the securing of the city through engagements with key leaders in the area, including Ahmed Wali Karzai, the half-brother of President Karzai and the dominant political and economic figure in the city. This engagement has culminated in the production of a refined plan for Kandahar City: Operation Hamkari de Kandahar Lepara (‘Co-operation for Kandahar’).

At the forefront of Carter’s effort is the need to create the political conditions for the security and development initiatives.  Decisively, he aims to support the Government of Afghanistan in addressing the ‘culture of impunity’ which is rife in the South. Here, local powerbrokers exploit their political and economic monopolies for their own benefit, corrupting government, the judiciary and commerce and alienating segments of the population.

In many cases, the activities of these powerbrokers have been a major cause of the insurgency. It is clear that challenging the culture of impunity is vital to ‘turning heads’ and demonstrating ISAF intent. Only through this challenge will it be possible to gain the trust of the people. General Carter is currently seeking to identify a decisive action which will convince the population of the credibility of Afghan governance and of ISAF.  Once the political conditions have been created, Afghan security forces will be boosted within the city to facilitate development projects.

The early stages of Hamkari are a long way from traditional military activity but it demonstrates a level of political awareness which will be essential for long-term success in Afghanistan.  Other elements of Hamkari primarily involve ANSF and ISAF forces addressing the insurgency in the rural city environs and will most likely be fully initiated later on this year, when the surge is complete and the political, security and development opportunities are aligned.

Although Carter’s prioritization of the political is surely correct, there is some doubt whether his attempts to connect the people of Afghanistan with the formal offices of government can be successful in precisely the form he currently envisages. Afghanistan is highly fragmented socially and politically, especially on tribal lines, which obstructs any attempt to co-opt the population as a whole. A more pragmatic strategy may be to use the Government of Afghanistan not only to connect with the people but primarily to leverage the powerbrokers.

In particular, ISAF might use formal government to moderate the behaviour of some of the powerbrokers whose actions have generated popular grievances leading to the insurgency.

In November, CJTF 6 hands over to the US 10th Mountain Division. It will be their task to maintain the momentum of the plan which Carter initially conceived on Salisbury Plain. The continued security of Kandahar City in 2011 and the success of the entire Afghan campaign is likely to rest on their performance, so important is the city to the Pashtuns.

The fact that 10th Mountain Division will finish what Nick Carter originally conceived in no way impugns the work of CJTF 6.  On the contrary, while 10th Mountain Division will run its own campaign, it will closely follow the current concept. Indeed, the present team is already working alongside 10th Mountain Division to produce a joint Operational Order for 2010-2011, with Major General Carter recently signing off a joint Commander’s Intent with his US counterpart Major General James Terry.

The close connections between 6 Division and 10th Mountain Division is strategically important. While the British represent an important but increasingly small part of the purely military effort in Afghanistan, the British concept of operations will inform campaigns in the coming year in the decisive region of Afghanistan — the South: Kandahar, Helmand and on the highways.  

As a result, the work of 6 Division — unacknowledged and, indeed, largely unknown in the UK — has been critical in reaffirming the credibility of the British military in the eyes of the Americans. If the maintenance of the transatlantic link is one of the main strategic pay-offs of the British commitment to Afghanistan, then the work of 6 Division has been vital.

The white-board schematic which General Nick Carter drew in West Down Camp in July 2009 has had unwitting international and perhaps historical significance for Britain.

Anthony King is Professor of Sociology at the University of Exeter and has worked closely with the armed forces as an adviser since 2003.