Rebuilding Gaza must not become a political football

The recently ceased, 22-day conflict between Israel and Hamas left hundreds dead, thousands of buildings destroyed or damaged and tensions raised to extreme heights. Yet, as troubling as this situation may be, the reconstruction of Gaza could make it worse.

Western donors, in particular, intend to use post-conflict reconstruction funding to strengthen the role and image of the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority (PA) in Gaza in hopes of weakening support for Hamas, the politico-militant movement which the European Union and United States classify as a terrorist organisation. Meanwhile, Iran, Syria and others have stated their intentions to work with Hamas. Both sides have democratic and/or constitutional justification for their preferred funding mechanisms, though the present dispute is far more than a legal one.

Deciding to whom to provide reconstruction assistance is a deeply political and sensitive matter, and the seemingly small possibility that Hamas would use international assistance to re-arm is likely the least significant issue. (Border controls, not financing, are its main impediment to re-armament.) Instead, supporting the Fatah-dominated PA, already perceived to have been a direct and intended beneficiary of the Israeli attacks, could re-ignite the sorts of intra-Palestinian factional fighting which erupted in mid-2007 (and periodically since then). In the early days of the conflict, in late December, Hamas-Fatah violence was reported by the International Crisis Group, and fighting may once again break out as different international actors strengthen two parallel governments.

Though resumed factional conflict remains the most immediate concern, a medium-term perspective highlights the importance of ensuring that development indicators in the West Bank and Gaza do not continue to drift apart. Since 2005, when Israel withdrew from Gaza while clamping down harder on the transport of people and goods, unemployment has increased markedly, and private-sector activity has been decimated by the inability to import or export materials and goods. Since the Hamas takeover in June 2007, Israel has withheld tax revenues collected specifically for the Gazan population, and major international donors have experimented with non-governmental funding mechanisms which, nonetheless, failed to stave off a protracted humanitarian emergency.

During this same time period, the West Bank’s economy has improved, and donor-supported public administration reform has helped to curb corruption and improve service delivery. Israel and Western countries intend the divergence between Gaza and the West Bank to highlight the benefit for Gaza should Hamas and its supporters cease firing rockets and welcome reconciliation with Fatah and consolidation of the PA. While many Gazans may share this same aspiration, the psychological impact of the recent violence is likely to entrench Hamas’s public support as well as its unwillingness to make concessions. An independent poll conducted in early February indicated that Hamas remains more popular than Fatah in both the West Bank and Gaza. As such, democratic processes will continue to be put on hold (potentially further postponing the April 2009 elections originally scheduled for January) by a Hamas-wary Western-led international community, and the peace process will remain stuck in neutral (if not reverse).

The reconstruction of Gaza, however, may help to prevent factional in-fighting, improve living conditions in Gaza and, thus, facilitate Palestinian unity if done correctly. In a report released on 19 January 2009, at which time both sides had agreed to a ceasefire, the authors (with Jenny Hunt) released a report, The Reconstruction of Gaza. Chief among this report’s recommendations is the need to establish an inclusive Gaza Reconstruction Commission (GRC) to allow technical experts (e.g. engineers, doctors and public administration experts) from Hamas, Fatah, Islamic Jihad and other factions to work together in setting priorities, identifying implementing partners and disbursing funds. Facilitated by an international leader with a successful record in conflict resolution, this Commission could demonstrate the benefits of Palestinian unity and allow credit to be shared by all factions. Careful oversight by key donors and international financial monitors would prevent misappropriation of funds and resolve most legitimate security concerns.

Such a technically-oriented approach would, however, require recognition among predominantly Western donors that Hamas is far more than a ‘terrorist’ organisation. It is a popular political movement with broad electoral support, a key role in social service provision and overwhelming moral authority. Allowing it to play a role in reconstruction is largely unavoidable and, more importantly, will promote a more effective recovery for Gaza, help prevent factional conflict and move the group closer to dialogue with Fatah and to a long-term peace agreement with Israel.

Donor countries such as Britain may not be able to deliver peace on a plate, but it can ensure that its assistance acts as a force for peace rather than for violence. For many of us engaged in the study of post-conflict reconstruction, this entire process will say as much about whether or not the international community has learned its lessons from post-2001 Afghanistan, post-2003 Iraq and post-2006 southern Lebanon. Will all relevant actors, regardless of our feelings towards them, be included in order to facilitate stability and, eventually, peace? Or will politics continue to render partial solutions with ‘preferred’ partners that simply exacerbate rather than mitigate conflict-causing tensions?

The aforementioned report, The Reconstruction of Gaza, may be found online at: http://www.york.ac.uk/depts/poli/prdu/publications.htm