Britain and Iran? We know far more than we think

The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee’s report on Iran published on the 2 March 2008, offers one of the most comprehensive assessments of British policy towards Iran of recent years (the last report was issued in 2004).

The report itself, at 54 pages, is supported by extensive documentation: largely the oral and written evidence submitted by various specialists, myself included.  Dominated as we are in Britain by our relations with the EU and the transatlantic alliance, Britain’s relations with the wider world are regularly relegated to the shadows, only emerging when one crisis or another grabs the headlines.

Iran, certainly since 1979, appears thoroughly alien to the British world view, intruding on our popular horizon only to reinforce this particular perspective. Yet few countries have played such a profound role on the British consciousness, or enjoyed such an intimate one.

One needs only to refer to the classical European name for the country, Persia, to ignite a certain sense of nostalgia for an old friend among a particular class of Britons, but even the historically unaware would be familiar with the adjective if not the place.

Suffice to say that Britain has enjoyed formal diplomatic relations with Iran for the better part of two centuries (relations of one sort or another stretch back a further two hundred years), and that this year marks the centenary of the foundation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, the corporate forerunner of British Petroleum.

That anniversary alone, and the fact that there appear to be no public commemorations of the event should serve to highlight that while Anglo-Iranian relations are historically profound, they are also complicated.

The focus of this report is of course contemporary; while some reference is made to the historical context and Iran’s own historical situation these are noted rather than elucidated — unsurprising when one sees the remit of the report.

Given the relative paucity of knowledge on Iran among the political class, reflected perhaps in one notable typographical error: the name of the last Shah who was deposed in 1979 (p. 8), one wonders whether some sort of historical primer would be useful. It would contextualise just why Britain’s role, both in relation to the current nuclear impasse and in terms of Iran’s broader relations with the West, is so particular and, I would argue, important.

Most American reports of this nature start the chronology in 1979 — a date which tends to frame the debate. It would be good to have a British report with a chronology beginning in 1800.

Be that as it may, the report itself, grounded as it is in the Committee’s own research, including factfinding missions to Iran, along with expert testimony, is a comprehensive analysis. It is carefully constructed and nuanced (perhaps overly so in places). I find little to disagree with in respect to its main recommendation, unsurprising in the circumstances, and I fully endorse their criticism of the EU failure to adequately and emphatically follow up on Iran’s initial suspension of its uranium enrichment activities.

The protracted negotiations and consequent stalemate were themselves a reflection of the fact that the EU3 had to maintain a dialogue with both Iran and the United States, a trilateral negotiation which facilitated (though did not cause) the hardening of political attitudes in Iran and a fatal loss of credibility for the Khatami’s reformist administration, 1997-2005, in Iran.

They are likewise correct to highlight the secondary importance given to other issues, especially human rights, while matters of nuclear security took centre stage. The FCO takes issue with this conclusion and not without merit. Formal protests over the decline in human rights continue to be made. However, in light of the dramatic increase in volume that the nuclear crisis enjoyed, there can be little doubt that in relative, if not absolute, terms the issue of human rights did at times struggle to make itself heard.

This is the only significant point over which the FCO has sought to protest its innocence and it is a good indication of how seriously it takes this particular issue that it has chosen to do so. Otherwise, there is little among its sober recommendations which one could realistically dispute.

The report wisely avoids a direct confrontation with the government over the Mujahideen-e Khalq (MeK), limiting itself to a recommendation for greater information and clarity on the government’s position. As far as this reviewer is concerned the more information and transparency on this delicate issue, the better.

I would take issue with the report in one area alone, and that is its assessment of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which arguably the authors have absorbed somewhat belatedly. The NIE is accepted almost at face value with little analysis of its implications, especially for European policy.

It would have been interesting to read the report had they had time to solicit expert testimony which, judging from my own encounters, would have been almost wholly derogatory. European officials have been earnestly protesting that the presentation and consequent media interpretation of the NIE was flawed; that what we had here was a report that had been ‘sexed-down’.

Whatever the quality of the intelligence on which it relied, there are two particular aspects that were problematic for this reviewer.  In the first place, flatly contradicting the European position which has been predicated on unknowns and the need for Iranian transparency, the Americans suddenly announced that they knew Iran had a weapons programme but it had been suspended since 2003.

The European insistence that Iran verify the peaceful nature of the programme, now appeared to miss the point altogether. In this scenario, Iran has been quite emphatically in breach of the NPT, it is no longer a matter for doubt and suspicion.

On the other hand, for those for whom the glass has always been half empty, the fact that Iran has now suspended its programme, would seem to suggest that the problem has been solved. In truth the NIE report was written by an intelligence community jittery about a trigger-happy Bush administration and in this respect the impact was emphatic though not permanent.

The FAC report concludes that military action now seems less likely. It is a sad reflection on the poor state of US-Iran relations that this assessment already appears dangerously out of date.

Professor Ali Ansari, University of St. Andrews. He is author of  ‘Confronting Iran: The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the Roots of Mistrust’, (C Hurst and co, 2006).