A better today than the one we got on Good Friday

Ten years since the signing of the Belfast Agreement there is a stable devolved administration working at Stormont. If you ignore the facts of what happened during those years it is easy to see how some will claim it was the Belfast Agreement which delivered the devolution now in operation.  It is despite rather than because of the Belfast Agreement that a settlement supported by unionists as well as nationalists was eventually arrived at. Even the negotiations leading to the Belfast Agreement were fatally flawed.  The mindset of unionists at the table in 1998 was that there had to be an agreement, no matter what its content. This was the mindset which said unionists always walked away from negotiations worse off than they had previously been. It was not a good deal but simply any deal that was being sought at that time. The outcome in 1998 of those negotiations is testament to that.  When unionism was divided by those prepared to accept Sinn Fein’s entry into talks without decommissioning it not only weakened the unionist position but paved the way for republicans to carry on holding and using those weapons whilst sitting in the government of the Belfast Agreement.  There was also no sanction when they were found to be involved in illegal activity. The IRA continued with terrorism and crime, not only holding weapons but importing more and selling terrorist advice and training to other groups around the world.  Ministers entered office free from accountability, whether this was within Northern Ireland or in any cross-border activity. Within Northern Ireland ministers were able to act simply on behalf of a sectional political interest with the Assembly powerless to affect any decision. Similarly the work of ministers within cross-border bodies and the bodies themselves were free from any control from within Northern Ireland. Whilst the opportunity for sectional interest could be open to all within Northern Ireland the possibilities within the cross-border institutions were a republican dream come true. Para II of Strand Two said that ‘the implementation bodies will have a clear operational remit. They will implement on an all-Ireland and cross-border basis policies agreed in the Council’. The Northern Ireland input into this Council did not have to be agreed around the Executive table leaving nationalists and republicans free to advance a united Ireland within the structures of the Belfast Agreement. Unionists could ask some questions in the Assembly chamber but were utterly powerless to amend or stop any decision taken by those ministers.  What is more worrying is that these bodies had the capacity to grow, taking in more and more powers over time, with unionists again powerless. The free-standing nature of these bodies was demonstrated during periods when the Assembly was suspended yet cross-border bodies continued their work. All this provided a platform for the continuing and increasing erosion of the Union. An administration in Northern Ireland working under this framework would simply have been marking time towards a united Ireland. The principle of consent, so loudly trumpeted, would have been rendered meaningless as unionists watched the constitutional rug being pulled from under them.  Without unionist support, it was inevitable that the Assembly and Executive would collapse, but the end of the Belfast Agreement was signalled with the election of the DUP as the largest unionist party in 2003. The DUP was given the mantle of unionist leadership and a mandate to deliver a new agreement capable of attracting unionist as well as nationalist support. However, the DUP could not adopt a ‘year zero’ approach and pretend that the situation it inherited was free from the influence of five years of the Belfast Agreement.  The failures and destructive ambiguities of the Belfast Agreement had to be addressed. Accountability was vital if people were to have confidence that government office would not simply be used by some to further a nationalist agenda. Accountability in cross-border activity was vital so that it would not be used as a nationalist tool to undermine the Union. The decommissioning of weapons, an end to illegal activity and support for policing by republicans was vital to put all parties in government on a level democratic playing field. The tenth anniversary of the Belfast Agreement will be used by some to claim that the Assembly and Executive operating in Northern Ireland today are basically the same as those established a decade ago. Having seen those structures rejected by unionists and ultimately falter and fall, it is not hard to understand why the supporters of the 1998 arrangements will make such an attempt. However, the reality today is very different to anything which could ever have existed under the Belfast Agreement.  Accountability has been established within government and cross-border co-operation can no longer be used to undermine the Union. Indeed any co-operation is now only carried out with the consent of the Assembly and subject to a unionist veto. Republicans now support policing structures always regarded as the foundations of the British state in Ireland. Such outcomes might have been the aspirations of unionists who entered negotiations in 1996, but they most certainly were not the outcomes of 1998. Whilst the visuals of an Assembly sitting in Parliament Buildings might be similar, the underlying structures are vastly different.  What is important now is that devolution works for the people of Northern Ireland. We have never viewed the establishment of devolved government as an end in itself, but merely as a tool to deliver a peaceful and prosperous Northern Ireland with its constitutional position secured. It was vital, however, to ensure that a fair deal was put in place in order to work towards a final destination of political institutions based on a voluntary rather than a mandatory footing.  As we stand back and compare the devolution of today to the devolution of a decade ago, we see the scale of the progress that has been made. We now have an Executive with a binding ministerial code and an agreed programme for government.  The economy is now government’s number one priority with a major USA/NI investment conference scheduled to attract inward investment. The planning system is being reviewed meaning that applications of strategic importance can be guaranteed an outcome within six months, and a new rural planning strategy is being developed.  Households are on average £1,000 better off as a result of a freeze on the regional rate. Culture and the victims of terrorism have seen increases in their funding ensuring that vital work in these areas can be increased. Devolution has not only worked to reverse decisions taken under direct rule which were bad for Northern Ireland but has set its own local agenda. The Belfast Agreement stands as a reminder of negotiations where tough issues were either dodged by unionists or tackled in such a matter as to lead to failure. It is a lesson in what happens when the primacy of law and order is ignored. Most notable now however is how those who failed will criticise current arrangements whilst simultaneously attempting to take credit for them. 

Nigel Dodds MP is Minister for the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment in the Northern Ireland Executive.  At the time of the Belfast Agreement Nigel Dodds was Secretary of the Democratic Unionist Party — a post he continues to hold.