Old wine, new bottle

The founding fathers of the European Union deliberately excluded foreign policy (although not foreign trade or commercial policy) from the Treaty of Rome. Foreign policy was to remain strictly a matter for the member states.

In subsequent years, however, starting in 1970 before the UK even acceded to the then EEC, member states began to take the view that foreign policy co-operation could be a good thing — they could wield more influence if they spoke and acted in common than if they continued to act on their own. British governments have consistently taken the same view since the UK’s accession in 1973, at least when not running scared of the Murdoch press and the Daily Mail.

But the arrangements for European Political Cooperation (EPC) that the member states worked out ad hoc as they went along — and renamed the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) but little changed otherwise in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty — have increasingly shown themselves to be inefficient, verging on dysfunctional.

The management of the CFSP by successive six-monthly rotating presidencies among countries of differing size, international standing, competence and even interests, with very little provision in the EU budget and patchy representation by presidency embassies in third countries, was chaotic. That most of the incentives and levers (such as aid and trade) available to the EU were controlled by the commission rather than the presidency or the council only added to the confusion.

Palliatives, notably the creation of the post of high representative for the CFSP and the subsequent appointment to it of a high-calibre international statesman (Javier Solana) in 1999, mitigated the worst problems but introduced their own dysfunctionalities (two actors, presidency and commission, became three with the HR/CFSP). That business functioned at all was an achievement.

It has been argued that there is no need for reform since the EU has managed perfectly well thus far. The oft-cited example of diplomacy regarding Iran’s nuclear ambitions actually demonstrates that, while the existing system can sometimes work, it is too fraught and unreliable a process to be a desirable norm.

The original EU3 (France, Germany, UK) launched the Iran initiative themselves because starting it within the existing CFSP framework would have meant entrusting the lead to an Italian presidency they did not trust. Excluding the presidency also meant that they had to exclude Javier Solana. But before long, the EU3 found themselves relying on incentives which only the EU could provide — aid and trade. There was also much resentment in the rest of the EU. Fortunately the circle was squared, no doubt because all concerned showed good sense, because the stakes were so high and because there was no real policy disagreement.

The EU3 with the participation of Solana (but still not the presidency) were given an EU mandate at the Rome European Council in December 2004 and now Javier Solana leads not only for the EU but also for the three plus three (EU3 plus the US, Russia and China). The changes in the Lisbon Treaty are an attempt to tame this haphazard dynamic, thereby making the institutional arrangements for operating the EU’s external relations fit for purpose.

The Reform Treaty does this not by transferring any new powers to Brussels from national capitals, nor by creating new powers outright, but by taking existing powers and functions and re-allocating them among foreign policy actors in Brussels (essentially, the presidency, the HR/CFSP and the commissioner for external relations). It replaces the rotating presidency and gives its functions of chairing the foreign affairs council and managing the CFSP to the HR/CFSP, and makes him (renamed EU high representative, or EUHR) also a vice president (VP) responsible in the Commission for external relations.

It also gives the EU high representative a so-called external action service (EAS) to assist him in his functions, with the commission’s existing overseas delegations placed under his authority. Indeed, it has been one of Javier Solana’s great handicaps that as HR/CFSP he did not have this vital asset; relying on presidency embassies was very hit and miss and commission delegations were generally unavailable because of institutional rivalries in Brussels.

The EAS is not, however, a new creation. The nearly 130 commission delegations (and two council liaison offices in New York and Geneva) already exist. Re-branding them into the EAS is no more than a common sense adaptation to the new allocation of tasks at the centre, making them too fit for purpose for an integrated EU foreign policy.

This is essentially what the foreign policy provisions of the Treaty are about: the integration of the EU’s foreign policy across the board, bringing together, under the coherent leadership of one person, the EUHR, the political objectives established by unanimity under the rules of the CFSP (which remain substantially unchanged by the Treaty) and the economic objectives and instruments established very largely by qualified majority voting in the commission’s areas of responsibility.

The reforms are not perfect. The removal of some fault lines has led to others. The functions of chairing the council, running the CFSP and managing and co-ordinating the commission’s actions in external relations have led to tensions in the past which will not go away just because they are now combined under one person.

The EUHR’s accountability to the council in some areas (CFSP) and the college of commissioners as a Vice President of the commission in others — indeed, to both where the two areas of policy come together, which is after all the intention — could give rise to resentments and tensions.

And the role in foreign policy of the new standing president of the European council, whose main function is to provide continuity and coherence over several Presidencies, is not clear. He is to represent the EU ‘at his or her level’, which is one thing for attendance at EU summits with third countries, quite another if (as will always be the temptation for former heads of government who are likely to get the job) he seeks to cut a figure on the world stage competitively with the EUHR. It has to be hoped that this will not be allowed to happen when the detailed arrangements are worked out in Brussels.

Nor are these reforms anywhere near enough to turn the old EU-foreign-policy banger with many not very careful drivers into a chauffeur-driven Rolls Royce. They are an important contribution, but more important will be the willingness, indeed the will, of the member states to agree to common foreign polices and to support the EUHR in fronting them; small member states will need to accept that, in the real world, weight counts and some larger EU member states must have a stronger role in CFSP than others, while large member states will need to accept that the interests of all must be respected. And of course the qualities of the EUHR, his ability to work with the member states and the quality and skills of his EAS staff will be crucial to the succesful functioning of foreign policy.

The UK has always supported foreign policy co-operation with our EU partners. If we now want meaningful foreign policy co-operation amounting to common polices and actions among 27 countries, recognizing that alone we carry little weight and dispose of the most limited resources, then it is in the UK’s interest to support the arrangements needed to make this possible.

The UK has the ultimate safeguard in CFSP that no decision can be taken without its consent, or at least acquiescence. The important decisions will continue under the Lisbon Treaty to be taken by unanimity. There is provision for implementing decisions to be taken by QMV (actually a provision in the existing treaties but never really used). But there is also the so-called emergency brake, or safety net: if a likely QMV decision would affect a member state’s vital interests, no vote can be taken. If no agreement can be reached the issue can be referred to the European Council by QMV, but the European Council decides on the issue itself by unanimity

There has been concern about the EU’s new legal personality, with some seeing it as giving the EU a new right to reach and sign international agreements committing the UK against its will. It does no such thing. Not only does the EU already have that right (typically now exercised through the Presidency, in future no doubt through the EUHR or, at summit level, the President of the European Council), but more to the point, it can only be exercised (in either case, i.e. with or without formal legal personality) under the authority of a unanimous decision of the Council. So, in practical terms, it is a distinction without a difference.

There is, however, no need for the UK to think in such defensive terms, rather the contrary. The UK is indispensable to an effective CFSP for all sorts of reasons, and remains at the core of the EU’s defence and security policy. No EUHR could afford to ignore this.

So there is a strong mutual interest among all the main players, whether in Brussels or national capitals, in making it work effectively. If it fails for one, it will fail for all. We shall have lost nothing by trying, but a lot by failing.

Brian Crowe is Deputy Chairman of Chatham House and formerly Director

General for External and Politico-military Affairs in the Council of the European Union.

This article was first submitted as evidence to the House of Lords European Union Sub-Committee C for their enquiry into the Treaty of Lisbon.