Has the West lots its way in fighting a media war?

Western democracies often struggle with counter-insurgency. This is partly due to its complex nature, but is mainly symptomatic of a general lack of understanding of how strategy functions. Counter-insurgency is war, an act of strategy: a battle of wills conducted through the use of force. The aim is to impose our will on the enemy and/or local inhabitants. Whether or not we can impose our will in places like Iraq, will depend on events in two crucial areas: the theatre of operations, and the domestic front. The West needs a clear theory of victory, the will to pursue it, and patience.

Within the theatre of operations a number of activities come together to constitute a successful counter-insurgency campaign. These include both military and non-military activities.

Much emphasis has been given to ‘hearts and minds’. Winning the support of the local population certainly confers advantages. In particular, supportive inhabitants can provide important intelligence on insurgent activities, support local development projects and generally undermine insurgent attempts to establish a lasting presence. Thus, just treatment of the citizenry and the development of infrastructure and local services can produce important and positive results.

However, counter-insurgency is not a competition in popularity; historical evidence suggests that it is a competition in authority. The majority of people yearn for stability, security and a reasonable standard of living. Pragmatically, their allegiance, or at least their acquiescence, is usually based on an assessment of who will prevail and so provide for their basic needs in the future.

How is authority established? The advice of Julian Paget, the British theorist and practitioner of counter-insurgency, is clear: ‘the government must demonstrate its determination and its ability to defeat the insurgents.’

The defeat of enemy forces is the most profitable activity and in counter-insurgency this comes through the gradual attrition of the insurgents. This reduces the enemy’s capability to challenge our presence and activities, reduces his will to resist, and discourages potential recruits.

An insurgency is built around a committed cadre, but for an insurgency to develop it must recruit from a broader support base. These potential recruits are much less likely to sacrifice themselves for a losing cause. Defeat of the enemy is also an indicator of power, which in turn exerts an influence on the decisions of the local population.

With this in mind, the recent increase in US troop numbers in Iraq is a step in the right direction, and is to be welcomed. Only time will tell if it is enough.

Since counter-insurgency is so complex a form of war, incompatibilities may sometimes exist between military and non-military activities.

For example, military operations may alienate sections of the community or set back development efforts. Ideally, force should be used in a manner that is in balance with, and supportive of, other activities.

However, war by its nature is an uncertain and somewhat chaotic activity; the ideal is rarely achieved. The best course when conducting military operations is to minimise any negative consequences for winning hearts and minds, whilst prioritising the enemy’s defeat.

To prevail in counter-insurgency, we must control the country, and this is best assured by defeating those who resist. Increasing levels of control produce a more conducive environment for development projects in the political, social and economic spheres — which in turn supports the military campaign by promoting hearts and minds.

A common error in modern counter-insurgency is the toleration of external sanctuaries and support for insurgents. This was as much a problem for the US in Vietnam as it was for the Portuguese in their African colonies. Such toleration is based on questionable assumptions concerning the limited nature of the war and the understandable desire not to escalate it.

Although the aim of preventing escalation may be based on a sensible analysis of the geopolitical environment, it can merely prolong the war, raise the costs and ultimately risk defeat. Sanctuaries and external support encourages an enemy and provides him with a constant flow of resources and safe areas into which he can retreat and regroup his forces.

To counter this, the battlefield needs to be physically isolated, but for geographical reasons that may not be possible, and other actions may have to be contemplated. More robust diplomatic activity may be needed to dissuade external actors from interfering in an insurgency. In addition, if external support is felt to be significant, military action may be needed to destroy sanctuaries, reduce support and deter future interference.

The policy-maker may have to decide which is the least desirable outcome: escalation, or protraction with the potential for eventual defeat. And if a foreign actor is actively supporting an insurgency it is effectively already engaged in a war, albeit indirectly, so efforts to prevent escalation may already be redundant.

Since war is a battle of wills, events at home play an important part in any conflict, too. Every parliamentary debate calling for troop withdrawal, every street protest against a war, or every newspaper editorial questioning the costs of a conflict may play into the hands of the enemy.

This creates a substantial problem for modern democracies. To cease political debate on a subject as important as war would be both undesirable and impossible. Nonetheless, those engaged in such debates should be aware that their actions have strategic implications.

As a democracy squabbles over the costs and legitimacy of a war, the emboldened enemy may be encouraged to continue their campaign of violence to further exacerbate schisms.

Modern democracies also struggle because they generally try to wage war on the cheap. Perhaps in response to the domestic political environment, troop numbers are often limited to reduce potential casualties. This is a mistake. Counter-insurgency needs substantial resources and commitment — together with the recognition that the infantry-based character of this warfare makes troop deployments more vulnerable to casualties.

In an age of 24/7 media, public and political will has to be even more robust. Faced with regular images of war, it is understandable that the costs of action are questioned. Our enemies understand this and seek to increase the costs and maintain a flow of demoralising images for our consumption.

As the successful 12-year campaign in Malaya reveals, counter-insurgency is often protracted, and this requires Western societies to learn patience, not easy in an age when the media by its nature is impatient and demanding. Counter-insurgency is a notoriously difficult form of war in which to judge progress — to estimate success against elusive, irregular foes, or to measure the will of the population.

The Malayan experience suggests that the ingredients for victory may take many years to come to fruition. In late 1951, three years into the Malayan campaign, the insurgents seemed to have the upper hand. Terrorist attacks were commonplace and in October Sir Henry Gurney, the High Commissioner, was assassinated. However, with the implementation of the Briggs Plan, Britain had already sown the seeds of success. That it took a further nine years to finally defeat the insurgency should provide us with a greater appreciation of the challenge in Iraq.

Malaya also reveals the range and scale of effort required to succeed. To isolate the insurgents from their popular support base, 423,000 ethnic Chinese were forcibly relocated into secure ‘New Villages’. Security was enforced by mandatory ID cards, curfews and detention without trial. Hospitals and schools were built as positive incentives to support the government.

Finally, the military campaign took years to mature, but over time had a debilitating affect on the enemy. In all, one hundred thousand British troops served in Malaya and suffered over five hundred deaths.

In any war, including complex counter-insurgency campaigns in places like Iraq, a theory of victory is required. The current enthusiasm for discussion of exit strategies in terms of dates is nonsensical. An exit strategy has to be dictated by the committed pursuit of clear policy objectives.

We must understand that at the heart of war is a dynamic and competitive relationship with the enemy: wars cannot be fought entirely to suit our political and social sensibilities. They have a unique nature — unlike any other political activity. If we do not recognise and respect this, we leave ourselves vulnerable to an enemy who does. The West must become strategy-savvy.

Despite the pessimism generated by the situation in Iraq, success in counter-insurgency is possible — if we respect strategy. As in Vietnam, the insurgents in Iraq cannot win whilst the multinational forces remain in substantial numbers. The insurgents’ immediate strategic objective must be to force the withdrawal of our forces. To prevent this, and to achieve our policy objective of a stable and democratic Iraq, we must prepare ourselves for a long and costly fight. Over time Iraqi government forces may undertake the majority of the fighting.

Until then, and in support of that outcome, we must establish our authority through a judicious balance of military predominance and a campaign for hearts and minds. Military victory alone cannot produce lasting success. It is, however, the foundation upon which that success has to be built.

David J. Lonsdale is a Lecturer in Strategic Studies at the University of Hull. Prior to this he served as a Lecturer at the University of Reading and as a Lecturer in Defence Studies for King’s College London, based at the Joint Services Command and Staff College.