A quick fix for Europe, then the long fix for France

The election of Nicolas Sarkozy as President of the French Republic is widely regarded as signalling a shift in France’s European policy. In a campaign where European issues were conspicuous by their absence, Sarkozy had been by far the clearest of the main candidates to the top job as regards his plans.

A quick fix had to be found to overcome the stalemate created by the French and Dutch No to the draft constitutional treaty. Turkey, being an Asian country, had no vocation to join: some kind of 'privileged partnership' has to be tailor-made to anchor it to the Union. Having settled these two thorny issues, Europe should then focus on topics that matter most to ordinary citizens, such as how to create growth and jobs.

Significantly, one of the first trips abroad of the new President, after the ritual visit paid by newly-elected Presidents to the German Chancellor, was to Brussels, where he held talks with President Barroso and the Commission. This was a notable first in French politics: by this gesture Sarkozy intended to signal that ‘France was back in Europe’, as his aides put it.

Why Europe was deemed to deserve so much attention can be explained by factors of two kinds.

First, France traditionally likes to think of itself as a natural leader of Europe. In classical accounts of the history of the European construction, it is depicted as the country that acted most in favour of more integration, together with Germany.

Needless to say, this account omits key episodes in which France violently pulled the break, such as the rejection of the European Defense Community or the ‘empty chair’ crisis triggered by the Gaulle in 1965.

Be that as it may, that vision has structured the behaviour of generations of Frenchmen, so much so that even large numbers of those who campaigned against the draft European Constitution made a point of explaining that theirs was a ‘Pro-European No’.

For the pro-European elites, the result of the referendum was perceived as humiliating: France found itself on a back seat, condemned to react to others’ moves. Worst still, it discovered that after the enlargement of the EU it has rather few allies, as was made apparent in 2003 when the Europeans clashed about the prospect of a military offensive in Iraq.

The decision to convene a meeting of the 18 countries that have ratified the draft constitution in Madrid a few weeks ago was widely resented in Paris as a signal that action was needed to restore France’s credit in Europe.

Secondly, at the domestic level, Sarkozy campaigned on a programme of ‘rupture’, aiming at modernising the French economy. He knows that it is most likely on these issues that his actions will be judged by voters, determining his ability to win a second term. But reforms are politically costly: the last thing he wants is this process to be hampered by decisions taken at the European level.

France’s willingness to accept thorough reforms is unlikely to be increased by one more divisive debate on the future of Europe. Hence the President’s eagerness to clear his desk of the European Treaty: the sooner, the better. To put it otherwise, it is because European issues are secondary that they must be treated urgently.

How? In a speech delivered in Brussels in September 2006, Nicolas Sarkozy outlined the contours of a plan largely attributed to one his advisors, MEP Alain Lamassoure: a ‘simplified’ treaty, reiterating most institutional provisions (contained in Part I of the draft constitutional treaty), which were not the object of much criticism during the referendum campaign. The text would be presented as a mere amendment of the Nice Treaty and all constitutional rhetoric would be banished in order to allow a parliamentary ratification. It could later be followed by a more open negotiation on the longer-term objectives of European Union, but that should not delay the ratification process.

Although the feasibility of this plan was disputed, it is fair to say that it was one of the most astute proposals put forward to overcome the current stalemate. Furthermore, having announced his plan well ahead of the campaign and received a strong support of French voters, President Sarkozy can legitimately claim to have a mandate to carry it out.

Even before the May election, this proposal has emerged as a possible middle way between countries that have already ratified the draft constitution and those that seem most opposed to changes to the current Treaty.

A questionnaire circulated by the German presidency of the EU has documented the emergence of a consensus on principles to be included in the new treaty. They include a simpler system of decision-making by the Council of Ministers; an extension of decisions by qualified majority vote, including on some aspects of justice, migration policy and the fight against organised crime; a consequential extension of the co-decision powers of the European Parliament; the replacement of the rotating presidency system with ‘Team Presidencies’ bringing together three countries and a full-time president for the European Council; an enhanced status for the EU High representative for foreign policy, even though the title of ‘EU Foreign Minister’ is now contested.

Assuming an agreement could be reached on all these points, a number of difficult issues would remain, such as the Union’s legal personality or the status of the charter of fundamental rights, which was supposed to be included in the constitutional treaty. Some, including Chancellor Merkel, have demanded a more explicit commitment to social cohesion and sustainable development. Others, like the Netherlands or the Czech Republic, would like the subsidiarity principle to be given more teeth.

More generally, France’s proposal, probably influenced by the debates that took place during the referendum campaign, seems to underestimate the conflict potential of the institutional chapter. Poland remains unconvinced by the proposed distribution of votes in the Council, and smaller countries are reluctant to give away ‘their’ commissioner. The draft constitution was a package deal; reviving only parts of it threatens the overall balance of the compromise.

The road to a final agreement is therefore rife with difficulties.

As is often the case in a complex negotiation, upholders of the status quo are in a privileged situation: they may object to any amendment until their concerns are met. Opposition to the ‘double majority’ principle retained for votes in the Council of Ministers (55% of Member States representing at least 65% of the EU population) might for instance result in a reduction of the number of areas in which a shift to voting is accepted.

This, arguably, would be an ill-inspired move: votes mostly serve as a way to overcome a stalemate in the Council in case of persistent objections by one or two governments; in such a situation, the share of votes each country has is rarely of primary importance.

Even if an agreement could be reached amongst governments, its ratification is anything but sure. Even before the 2005 referenda, ‘accidents’ had occurred at the time of earlier treaty reforms. How can one avoid a repetition of this scenario? The problem is particularly acute for those countries that have already ratified the draft Constitutional treaty: why go through another ratification process unless they are sure their partners will follow suit? On paper, there is one easy answer to that question: do away with unanimity and accept that a new treaty can come into force once ratified by a large majority of states but, needless to say, no government is contemplating this possibility for the present time.

Finally, a mighty question remains: in case the simplified treaty envisaged by Sarkozy sees the light of the day, would it enable the EU to respond to the concerns voiced by those who voted ‘No’ in the 2005 referenda?

Even in those countries where the treaty was ratified, the social categories that appeared most reluctant were the same: blue collar workers, the youth, people with a low level of education. That is easily explained, since those categories feel threatened by the social and economic change under way in Europe.

Would a treaty limited to institutional issues suffice to allay their fears? That is doubtful. Would it enable the Union to act in a more resolute manner to respond to their demand for more security? That is equally unlikely. The draft treaty was already a fairly conservative arrangement, and there is no chance that a new treaty will go any further. Even if a simplified treaty is eventually ratified, it will not solve Europe’s legitimacy deficit. But, as said, that is not Sarkozy’s problem: his priorities are elsewhere.

Renaud Dehousse, Centre d’études européennes de Sciences Po, Paris.