Could these men bring peace to Iraq?

Confirmation that cordial meetings had taken place between American diplomats and top-ranking Iraqi officials together with tribal leaders and representatives from Iraq’s insurgency groups, brought into the spotlight the first serious contact to have taken place between both parties since the outbreak of the war in Iraq. The high level discussions in Jordan in October 2006 were designed to reach an understanding which would force an end to the escalating violence.

These exploratory talks were followed up by American requests to tribal leaders and representatives of the warring Sunni resistance groups that they should form a so-called ‘Political Council for the Resistance’ to ensure that any agreements reached during future negotiations would be respected by all parties. The new American approach to calm the volatile situation was welcomed by tribal leaders who had become isolated from the political parties whom they accused of being responsible for hijacking the representation of the Iraqi people. Unlike the politicians, tribal leaders seek no favours from the American-led coalition and have never felt obliged to stand at the gates of the American or British embassies in Baghdad’s fortified Green Zone to ask for intervention on their behalf to be appointed to this post here or that job there. As far as these elders are concerned, it is they and only they who have the right to decide who governs their areas.

Last month’s negotiations were a scaled up version of clandestine discussions held in spring 2005, entered into by American commanders with tribal leaders in al Anbar province, home to the most influential tribes in the country. Together with senior ministers in Ibrahim al Jaafari’s government, including Minister of Defence, Saadoun al Dilaimi and Minister of the Interior Bayan Jaber, the pivotal gathering hammered out solutions, cooling down the combustible situation in Iraq’s largest province in what is described by the West as the Sunni Triangle. The negotiations also secured help from the assembled tribal leaders in patrolling the porous borders Iraq shares with Syria and Iran to prevent the illegal passage of foreign elements into the country. It was the first official recognition by the American-led coalition that peace can only be achieved with the involvement and full cooperation of the tribes.

When a leader of the Shammer tribe, Sheikh Ghazi Ajil al-Yawer, was appointed as president of Iraq’s transitional government in 2005, many observers including myself, heaved an audible sigh of relief that mistakes committed by the American-led coalition in April 2003 following the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime were about to be addressed. In particular ignoring the role of the tribes, dissolving the army and their de-Ba’athification policy. But our relief was short-lived. The American administrator of Iraq, Paul Bremer appointed Dr Iyad Allawi, a former Baathist who was living in exile in London after falling foul of Saddam Hussein, as the interim prime minister, sidelining al Yawer whose role was diminished to that of performing ceremonial functions. Whereas numerous suicide bombers targeted the Allawi motorcades and his party headquarters, al Yawer did not face such threats. He was able to travel freely, with the minimum of security, confident in the protection his status as a tribal leader of one of Iraq’s largest tribes, with several million members in Iraq and neighbouring countries, afforded him. Opponents of the political process in Iraq would have been unwise to harm al Yawer: the consequences of each member of his tribe taking revenge according to tribal laws would be catastrophic. It was a very effective deterrent and should have been considered as a means to contain law and order during the country’s transition.

Iraq is peopled by thousands of tribes. Giving Iraq’s tribal leaders a prominent political role is — according to Sheik Sami Azara al Ma’ajoun, leader of a major Shia tribe in al Samawa province — the only dependable option left open for the American-led coalition to bring peace and stability to a country which has been ripped apart by conflict, insurgency and civil war.

A unique conference attended by six hundred tribal leaders in Baghdad in June 2006, with the full backing of Iraqi party political leaders, paved the way for a relaxation of the resolutions drawn up by Paul Bremer depriving more than one million supporters of Saddam’s Ba’ath party the right to seek government employment. The new approach is to allow Ba’ath activists whose hands were not bloodied by the crimes of Saddam Hussein to be embraced by the political process. Such progress could never happen if it was left up to the political parties in Iraq.

Many of the larger tribes have vocalised their opposition to the sectarian war, and claim that they are capable of reaching an understanding amongst themselves to put an end to the bloodshed if given the opportunity to do so. Shia/Sunni intermarriage was very common, meaning many tribes have both Shia and Sunni members; sectarianism is a recent phenomena, tribes run much deeper.

America was quick to capitalise on the anger vented by tribes in al Anbar province as they launched a campaign to flush out foreign insurgents loyal to al Qaeda. This campaign was initiated by tribes singled out by al Qaeda for bomb attacks. Their stance was supported by Prime Minister Nouri al Maleki’s government which rallied round to arm and finance them. Their efforts were rewarded with success in eliminating large numbers of al Qaeda members and sympathisers. The last meeting held between the Iraqi prime minster and the leaders of these tribes in early November 2006, ended with assurances given by the tribes of al Anbar province that the Iraqi police could resume its activities in the provincial capital of al Ramadi after years of denying them the right. Such a step would never have been possible without the assurances given by the tribes to the Iraqi prime minister that they would provide the police with protection to enable them to perform their duties in an area where barely a day passes without an official American announcement confirming the death of one or more of its soldiers at the hands of insurgents.

Historically Iraq has always relied on the wisdom of its tribal elders and religious leadership to sustain peace and stability, until the dark days of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath Party rule shifted the balance of power in the 1970s. This renewed glimmer of hope that tribal leaders, together with other wise members of the Shia, Sunni and Kurdish sects, will once again join forces and rebuild their battered country, arguing out their differences in their traditional way, is the only option available to lift the country out of the chaos it is currently facing. The guarantee for its success is the support of the Western world combined with the regional powers to allow Iraqis to progressively take control of their own affairs.

Zaki Chehab wrote ‘Iraq Ablaze: inside the Iraq insurgency’ (published by I. B. Tauris in London and Nation books in NewYork, January 2006). zaki@alhayat.com