Al-Qaeda Five Years On: The Threat and the Challenges. 

Since the attack on the Twin Towers on September 11th 2001, both those who sanctioned and organised the atrocity, and those who initiated the War on Terror have succeeded in fomenting a long drawn out battle that has opened up many fronts. While the West now faces a terrorist threat that comes from within its borders and which impinges on community relations and civil liberties, al- Qaeda itself is facing a very serious challenge to its legitimacy and potential popularity from within the Muslim World itself.

The War on Terror: The balance sheet.

Al–Qaeda as an organisation has been weakened since it carried out the atrocities of September 11th and consequently came under attack in Afghanistan and became subject to harsh security measures world- wide. The U.S. can argue that although legally dubious (and possibly harmful from a propaganda point of view), both the internment of captured personnel in Guantanamo and rendition coupled with other security measures have helped undermine the development of al-Qaeda’s core structure and may have even weakened the effective work of many of its cells.

Nonetheless, terrorist activity continues to mushroom in support of the ideology and tactics of an organisation under attack in its home base on the Afghan/Pakistan borders and whose leadership is on the run. The hampering and foiling of terrorist plots reflects a large measure of success on the part of security services from Europe to Pakistan, but the fact remains that terrorist attacks have continued over the past five years from Bali to Cairo and from Madrid to London, while the prospect of new attacks marks a large degree of failure in eliminating the threat.

As has been frequently cited, the absence of a formal single organisational structure has contributed to making the fight against this brand of terrorism more elusive and difficult. In addition the global nature of the supporting network and its use of the internet as a means of communication have all helped increase the difficulties faced in eliminating the threat. Equally critical, but not as tangible as the technical and logistical difficulties in facing al-Qaeda proper, is the continuing emergence of new terrorist cells and the radicalisation of individuals whether through recruitment or independently, especially in immigrant communities in the West.

Al –Qaeda’s Ace: The Regional Connection.

Political turmoil in the Middle East such as in Palestine, Iraq or Lebanon, as well as the survival of Arab regimes emboldens those who want to resort to violence as a means of reprisal and fuels the appeal and actions of al- Qaeda. When Al -Qaeda attacked the twin towers, the background against which it did so was the previous Iraq war and the U.S presence in Saudi Arabia. Worryingly for future developments, given the recent events in the Middle East, Bin Laden cited the Israeli attack on Lebanon in1982 as a key moment in the transformation of his perception and motivation.

While Muslim anger was galvanised around Iraq it hardly ever lost sight of the Palestinian cause which could always be conjured up by any radical movement, whether religious or secular, to rally support. If there is one area where there is a general consensus among Muslim majorities over the West’s double standards and the justification for the resort to suicide bombings, it would be in the case of Palestine. While the U.S. and U.K. governments continued to deny a linkage between regional crisis and terrorism not only al-Qaeda but also Muslims who condemn al–Qaeda continued to stress the linkage. Even Muslim governments acknowledge the linkage, particularly in regard to Palestine, and more recently the EU has acknowledged an implicit link between the two.

The Battle for Hearts and Minds.

Al – Qaeda’s Achilles Heel: The theological backlash.

The question remains whether al-Qaeda can ever regain the sympathy it seems to have generated in the days following 9/11 in the Muslim street and somehow build on that to create a more solid long term popular appeal. I would argue that it is not capable of doing so, not so much because of extensive security measures against it, but primarily because of three important factors.

First, attacks on Muslim civilians in Saudi Arabia and Jordan have resulted in a serious setback in terms of support in both these countries because of local civilian casualties. The fermentation of sectarian violence in Iraq has also tainted al-Qaeda’s image within the Muslim world.

Secondly, there has been a heightened radicalisation of the middle ground in the Muslim World. A growing number have imbibed the opposition politics of al- Qaeda but will not sanction its tactics and will pursue democratic avenues when they are made available.

Thirdly, there has been a growing discomfort and opposition religiously and morally to terrorism among Muslims. Al- Qaeda has driven a wedge within Muslim communities not about the importance of regional and international politics and the role of the U.S., but about the justification of violence in the name of Islam.

Europe’s Home-grown Enemy.

One of the fall-outs of September 11th is that al- Qaeda’s message found some, albeit very limited, support in Western societies. Those Muslims in the West that are connected with al- Qaeda are clearly a small minority. Arguing that they have not been integrated and are alienated from the countries where they are citizens may be valid but fails to take into account the extent to which they are also attracted to ‘a cause’ and in this they are not unique either as a group or historically.

It is as if post September 11th, the notion of a clash of civilisations has become a self- fulfilling prophecy, partly as a result of al- Qaeda’s own desire for confrontation with the West because it is through confrontation that it believes it can achieve change; and the West’s perception that it is defending democracy, a view voiced particularly by President Bush and PM Blair. For all the attempts at not pointing a finger at Islam as a religion, a polarisation has nonetheless increased between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and has contributed to attracting a marginalised element to al- Qaeda that is disillusioned with the state within Western societies in a cult like and anarchist response.

A large part of the challenge for the West, therefore, is how to deal with the reference to religion and religious values in the context of political activism and radicalism. Is it the main motivator of extremist politics? Despite religious references, the defining elements for al- Qaeda have primarily been political. Specifically, a hostile stance towards the U.S. and its policies in the Muslim World, as well as opposition to Muslim governments. Some analysts have emphasised Wahhabism and Salafism as theological traditions that lend themselves to extremism. I would argue that while radicalisation finds justification in religious interpretations, radicalism in itself is not set in any one tradition or religious sect.

Conclusion.

Al- Qaeda’s terrorism has forced the issue for a need to examine Western policies towards the Muslim world. Through terror it has communicated to the West that there are consequences to its policies. In the process it has laid the blame for all the ills of the Muslim World on the West, in a way which mirrors the post colonial blame by the secular socialist Arab regimes of western powers.

It has used its understanding of democracy to employ terror as leverage. Zawahiri is on record saying that since in democratic countries the people elect their governments, they become responsible for the action of these governments and so effectively lose the protection afforded by civilian status. This is echoed in the various speeches Bin Laden made to Western audiences including the offer for a truce post the Madrid bombings and in his messages to the Europe and the U.S. In essence, the message to the citizens of Western democracies is that it is their governments and not al-Qaeda who should bear the responsibility for the infliction of terror on their societies.

Although al- Qaeda is about the globalisation of terror for the promotion of a political agenda linked to specific regional issues, mainly in the Middle East, one of the more unexpected fall-outs of its actions has been the tensions that surfaced in Europe’s own immigrant communities around unresolved issues of integration and identity. Previous European terrorist organisations have either been about issues of independence or autonomy, like the IRA or ETA; or about challenging societal values, such as the Red Brigade or Baader Meinhof. Al- Qaeda has primarily posed a challenge on the political level about national causes and only on a secondary level, in representing alternative values and world view. However, like all terrorism it is an assault on innocent life, and as such operates outside the accepted parameters of conflict resolution. While sympathy for al- Qaeda has diminished fairly rapidly in the Middle East, nonetheless Muslim populations still have grievances that need to be resolved and not ignored.