No peace for Benn

The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) is in trouble. Since its signing in Abuja on 5 May there has been growing opposition to it in Darfur. Not only are schisms now appearing in the one faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) that signed it, not only has a new rejectionist alliance been formed by the factions who have held aloof, but there has been overwhelming dissatisfaction voiced in the camps of refugees and internally displaced persons.

Hilary Benn’s declaration that ‘in the end the people in the camps will be our judge’ (in the June edition of Parliamentary Brief), is being answered sooner, and more emphatically, than perhaps he expected.

In the debate about the content of the DPA there is general agreement that it offers a reasonable way forward, compatible with the interim period established by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in the South and the democratic transition promised in the new Interim National Constitution.

There is also a broad international consensus that the onus is now on the rejectionist Darfur movements to put aside their differences, accept the compromises worked out in the DPA, and come on board to make the best of such opportunities as are now open to them.

There is another line of analysis that sees the possible failure of the DPA as lying more in the flaws in the peace process itself than in the defects of its content. International pressure on the Abuja mediators to get quick signatures on an agreement, the lack of confidence-building measures preceeding it, and the track record of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) in breaching past agreements are seen as the most significant features undermining peace in Darfur. Just how does the Darfur peace process compare with other earlier Sudanese peace processes?

The Internal Peace of 1997 has some superficial similarities with the current state of the DPA. Then Khartoum made separate agreements with a succession of Southern Sudanese opponents of the SPLM. Most, if not all, of the commanders that signed these internal documents were politically and militarily dependent on Khartoum, so the accumulation of signatures was not indicative of broad-based support.

The exclusion of the SPLM, the largest Southern movement with the broadest base of popular support, was both the intent and the fatal flaw of this peace process — those who signed up could not deliver peace of any kind and were in no position to hold Khartoum to the terms of its own agreement. Lacking any real partner in the peace process the agreement fell apart.

The attempt to woo Darfur splinter groups to sign onto the DPA differs from the 1997 process in that the AU recognises only three movements (the two wings of the SLM and the JEM) and dissident commanders merely sign a Declaration of Commitment to abide by the provisions of the DPA.

But the accumulation of signatures of individual leaders by itself cannot create a momentum towards peace. Rather, the further erosion of such cohesion as the movements have might also destroy their ability to carry their constituents along in any agreement and deliver peace.

There are greater resemblances between the DPA and the IGAD peace process that led to the CPA, but there are significant differences, too. IGAD, like the AU, was an African initiative, with strong international support from the US and UK.

But here the similarities with Abuja end. The SPLM presented a united front in the negotiations. It was in a much stronger military position than the Darfur factions are now, and, though not representative of all Southern Sudanese, it did speak on behalf of the broad mass of Southerners. The SPLM was able to deliver on its commitment to peace in a way that none of the Darfur movements have done so far.

The IGAD negotiations proceeded through various stages, getting agreements on specific protocols before agreeing on the implementation modalities. Both the SPLM and the government of Sudan resisted international attempts to impose artificial deadlines. The resulting CPA, though criticised by many, was thus built on a firmer foundation than the DPA.

Given this experience, why did the international community not apply some of the lessons that could have been learned from the IGAD process, and instead replace it with deadline diplomacy? The text that the AU tabled in Abuja in April embodied much of what had been agreed between the negotiating parties, but the deadline for acceptance did not allow for further consultation between the parties and their constituencies, nor even for thorough discussion.

Having imposed a deadline, the international community did not impose sanctions on any party when the deadline passed. Rather, they extended the deadline. The imposition of a tight deadline that could not be met resulted in an agreement that cannot be kept.

The Darfur movements have rightly been criticised for their factionalism and lack of clarity in their objectives. But one factor influencing the movements was their distrust of Khartoum, based on the NCP’s record of violating previous agreements, and the flaccid response of the international community to these violations.

Even more worrying have been the NCP’s evasions implementing significant provisions of the CPA: the UN Military Mission (UNMIS) has been restricted in its investigation of ceasefire violations, many government militias in the South remain armed and intact, and there has been a slow implementation of various national commissions. But most worrying of all has been the failure to implement the Abyei Protocol.

There are many parallels between Abyei, on the border between the North and South, and Darfur: Abyei has similar environmental problems feeding into local conflicts and various regimes in Khartoum have manipulated and participated in these conflicts; the first use of government-supported tribal militias was in Abyei.

Abyei was subject to a separate protocol in the CPA, which placed it under the direct responsibility of the Presidency in Khartoum. An international commission was created to define the boundary of the area to be so administered, and its decision, according to language of the CPA, was ‘final and binding’, and was to be put into ‘immediate effect’.

The commission reported in July 2005, but Abyei is still under the control of military intelligence, government militias have not been demobilised or disarmed and the UNMIS force there has been restricted in its ability to operate. Opposition not just to the boundary commission report, but to the Abyei Protocol as a whole, is being organised by the NCP and from within the presidency itself — where the southern first vice president is outnumbered.

Meanwhile the US State Department and the FCO, having diverted their attention to the Darfur peace process, have yet to take any effective action in support of the implementation of this most sensitive of protocols in the CPA.

The DPA creates a number of commissions through which Darfuris are told they can participate in power and wealth sharing. It provides for a special assistant to the president who is supposed to be consulted on all matters concerning Darfur.

The demobilisation and disarming of the Janjaweed militias is to be undertaken by Khartoum, under the watchful eye of the movements themselves and the international community. Hilary Benn is reported to have assured the movements of guarantees concerning the implementation of these provisions.

But the fate of those provisions of the CPA which parallel these important aspects of the DPA is discouraging. If commissions cannot do their work, or are ignored when they do, if UNMIS can be prevented from carrying out its agreed monitoring of the ceasefire, if Khartoum fails to demobilise militias, if the first vice president cannot induce the presidency as a whole to live up to provisions of the CPA it signed, and if the international community allows the CPA to be undermined to this extent, why should anyone in Darfur believe that the DPA will be any different?

The flaws in the Darfur peace process cannot be corrected retroactively. But the implementation of the CPA can be more robust.

If the international community is serious about its desire to achieve peace in Darfur then it must support the implementation of the CPA more effectively, and more publicly, than it has done so far. In that way, perhaps, Darfuri confidence in the peace process might be built, they might be convinced that western guarantees will mean something, and they might then be persuaded to take a risk on the DPA.

Douglas H. Johnson is the author of The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, published by James Currey (an updated edition of which has just been released), and served as an international expert on the Abyei Boundaries Commission.