A nuclear confusion

A ‘European energy policy’ has long been the desire of the European Commission, driven largely by growing concerns about Europe’s energy dependency. In 2000 50% of all Europe’s energy use was imported and by 2030 this is expected to have reached 70%, when there will be much greater competition for such fuels from what are presently classed as developing countries.

The latest attempt to create such a policy was discussed at the Hampton Court European summit in October 2005, during the British Presidency. The 2006 EU green paper A European strategy for sustainable, competitive and secure energy advocated creation of a common external energy policy and pressing countries to ensure that Europe’s diversity of energy supplies was maintained or enhanced.

However, although the EU heads of states and governments broadly endorsed the Commission’s proposals, several countries restated that EU action should not impinge on national sovereignty and, for example, the idea of single European energy regulator was rejected. So while Europe retains competence for a number of issues of central importance to energy, notably competition policy and environmental protection, it has no direct power over the energy policy of any individual country.

One reason for this is the dramatic variation in attitudes towards nuclear energy in different European countries. It is inconceivable that a single policy could accommodate the vehement anti-nuclear stance of Ireland and Austria and the enthusiasm of France and the Czech Republic.

While the same broad trends about nuclear energy can be detected in most countries of North America and Western Europe — relative enthusiasm or at least neutrality in the 1960s and ‘70s, growth of relative antagonism in the 1980s and ‘90s and a swing back in the mid-2000s — the expression of these trends has differed considerably.

In many countries which never developed nuclear energy, policy decisions or laws were adopted in the 1990s to prevent them from ever doing so — but these have been followed in some cases — such as Australia — by government moves to re-examine the nuclear option.

In Italy initial enthusiasm towards nuclear energy resulted in the construction of four commercial reactors, all of which were closed by 1990 (the last three as a result of a post-Chernobyl referendum), but in 2005 Prime Minister Berlusconi said that Italy should not rule out a return to nuclear generation.

In other countries, the UK, USA and Canada included, early investment was followed by a period of stagnation and now renewed interest in new build, while in France bullish enthusiasm cooled to a commitment to replacing existing capacity in due course followed by an order for a new plant at Flamanville in 2006.

A review of attitudes and progress with respect to nuclear energy in different countries can yield interesting lessons for those advocating a return to nuclear technology.

In 1973 France generated 43% of its electricity using oil. Nuclear energy, on 8%, was a relatively small player. When OPEC increased oil prices sharply in that year France decided to pursue rapid nuclear development. Prime Minister Pierre Messmer outlined the pro-nuclear case in a speech on national television in March 1974: ‘France has not been favoured by nature in energy resources. In the effort that we will make to acquire a certain independence, or at least reduced dependence in energy, we will give priority to electricity and in electricity to nuclear electricity’.

Nuclear energy’s share of Electricité de France (EdF)’s total output rose to 20% in 1979, 49% in 1983 and 75% by 1990 — a demonstration that nuclear energy can be brought online very rapidly if there is a will to do so. By the end of 1990 France had a nuclear capacity greater than those of West Germany, the UK, Spain and Sweden combined and was exporting large amounts of power to Switzerland, Italy, the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain. The programme came to enjoy cross-party support — even when the Greens were part of a coalition government between 1997 and 2002 there was no suggestion of nuclear phase-out. In 2006 plans were announced for a new reactor at Flamanville.

One can perhaps identify two key features in the relative success of the French programme:

- political leadership determined to develop nuclear energy very quickly, based on a publicly attractive message about energy independence;

- standardisation of plant design.

Recent years have seen a new reactor order in Finland and the Netherlands reversing its policy of early closure of its commercial nuclear station at Borssele. In Switzerland, where a 1990 referendum had resulted in a ten-year moratorium on new nuclear stations, two referenda regarding the future of nuclear power in Switzerland were held in 2003. ‘Electricity without nuclear’ asked for a decision on a phase-out and ‘Moratorium plus’ suggested an extension of existing laws forbidding new build. Both were rejected heavily.

In Belgium, which generates half of its electricity using nuclear energy, public concern about nuclear energy had been growing since protests in 1979. In 1988 proposals for an eighth Belgian reactor were abandoned, followed in 1992 by an indefinite moratorium on new build.

In 1999 the government, then a Liberal/Socialist/Green coalition, introduced policies limiting the lifetime of the existing plants to 40 years. However, in September 2005 Belgium decided to overturn the decision to limit the lifetime of nuclear plants, delaying the phase-out for another 20 years with possible further extensions, although remaining silent on new build.

In Spain the Socialist government elected in 2004 had concluded a pact with the Green Party to phase out Spain’s remaining nine reactors by 2024. However, although one plant, Zorita, closed in May 2006 no firm timetable was set for closure of the other plants as concerns grew about Spain’s growing energy dependency and burgeoning greenhouse gas emissions.

After the Three Mile Island accident in 1979 Sweden held a referendum on nuclear energy, as a result of which parliament decided in 1980 that no further nuclear power plants should be built and that a phase-out should be completed by 2010. However, the phase-out has been limited to the two reactors at Barsebäck in 1999 and 2005 respectively. Sweden has policies not to develop any further hydropower resources — in 2005 47% of Sweden’s electricity came from nuclear energy and 44% from hydro — and to become independent of fossil fuels.

In a March 2005 opinion poll 49% of Swedes wanted existing reactors replaced at the end of their lifetimes and a total of 83% wanted them to be operated until the end of their lifetimes rather than being phased out earlier. In 2006 the Centre Party, an opposition party that was the first to argue for nuclear phase-out in the 1970s, announced that it was dropping its opposition to nuclear power, claiming that it was unrealistic to expect phase-out in the short term.

The general pattern is similar in North America. In the US all reactor orders placed since 1977 have been cancelled. However, in the early 2000s the price paid for nuclear stations changing hands began to grow significantly and there were applications for lifetime extension involving most of the fleet. The Energy Policy Act, which eventually entered law in 2005, included financial incentives for nuclear plants and indemnification against regulatory change for the first four to be ordered.

In June 2006, Ontario’s energy minister Dwight Duncan announced plans to spend up to C$20bn over 20 years in refurbishing existing reactors (eight of the Canadian province’s 19 plants were out of action in the mid-2000s) and building at least two new ones.

However, in a number of countries attitudes to nuclear energy did not seem to change. Those like Austria and Ireland maintained their long-standing opposition. The election of a Christian Democrat Chancellor, Angela Merkel (in coalition with the leftist SPD), in Germany did not result in a reversal of the phase-out policy of the previous SPD/Green coalition elected in 1998.

So Europe appears no closer to a single energy policy than ever. The range of different approaches — not just stemming from the range of energy resources available to each country (whether indigenous, but also from different political and national cultures, makes it unlikely that one will emerge. The future looks like it will be one of diversity not just of fuels but also of national energy policies.

Malcolm Grimston is an associate fellow with the Sustainable Development Programme at Chatham House.